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Abstract
We investigate the international propagation of fiscal policy shocks originated in the
United States using a Global VAR framework. We identify shocks to US tax rates and
government spending by using narrative series as external instruments, following the
proxy SVAR methodology. The main results of the paper are the following: (1) the
domestic effects of tax shocks are stronger than those of a government spending shock
(2) spillovers are in most cases positive and significant, albeit of small size; (3) the boost
to exports in recipient economies, stimulated both by stronger US demand and by real
exchange rate depreciation vis-a`-vis the US dollar, is the main transmission channel;
financial channels (through long-term interest rates and equity prices) also play a role.
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1. Introduction
Since the Great Recession, the discussion on the role of fiscal policy has gained traction,
as discretionary fiscal measures have started afresh to serve as policy tools in advanced
economies. During the global financial crisis, the US administration implemented a sizeable
fiscal stimulus, which supported the recovery in the United States; in contrast, during the
Euro area debt crisis many countries in Europe introduced tax increases and spending cuts
as a way to restore confidence in the sustainability of public debt. The US Congress has
recently adopted a major overhaul of the tax code, embracing tax cuts and also accompanied
by increases in military spending.
The renewed interest in fiscal policy has spurred considerable academic research on its
effects on economic activity. However, with much of the debate concentrated on the domestic
effects, much less has been said on the international dimension of fiscal policy and its
spillovers. This is the focus of this paper. First, we evaluate the domestic and spillover
effects of an expansionary fiscal shock in the United States, focusing on the international
channels of transmission. Our analysis provides answers to some relevant policy questions,
such as: does a fiscal expansion in the US increase output abroad? Is there heterogeneity
in the transmission across recipient countries? Are spillovers driven by real or financial
channels? Second, we provide evidence on how the impact of fiscal policy depends on the
specific instrument adopted, comparing not only tax versus spending, but also the specific
components of tax and spending policies. Are corporate and personal income tax shocks
both effective? Are their effects equally persistent? Do they propagate through the same
channels?
We answer these questions within a Global VAR (GVAR), the framework developed by
Pesaran et al. (2004), in which each country model features domestic and foreign variables
such as real GDP, inflation, real equity prices, interest rates, real exchange rates and exports.
In the US model, we also include fiscal variables, and identify spending and tax rate shocks
following the proxy-SVAR methodology, using the narrative series of Ramey and Zubairy
(2017) as instruments for general spending and government investment shocks, and those of
Mertens and Ravn (2013) for personal and corporate income tax rate shocks.
The main results of the paper are the following. First, the domestic effects of tax
rate shocks are stronger than those of general spending shocks: while the former delivers
multipliers consistently above unity, only the government investment shock, which represents
a small fraction of total government spending, has a multiplier larger than 1. This result
is in line with the most recent evidence showing that tax shocks have a stronger impact on
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output, and that spending shocks have multipliers on average below one ((Ramey, 2017)).
Second, spillovers are positive and statistically significant, albeit of a small size except in the
case of Canada; in particular, the size of spillovers is directly related to the domestic effect
of the shock, without any inherent difference between spending and tax shocks. Third, in
terms of geographical distribution, advanced countries are always impacted by US shocks,
while spillovers are not always significant in emerging ones; moreover, economies that are
geographically close to the US are not impacted in the same way, with Mexico benefiting less
than Canada from the US fiscal expansion.
The paper also investigates the international transmission mechanism of US fiscal policy.
The main channel through which fiscal shocks propagate is international trade. Independently
of the type of shock, following a fiscal expansion the United States increases its imports from
the rest of the world, stimulating output in foreign countries. This occurs via both a price
and a quantity effect. Indeed, in most cases foreign countries real exchange rates depreciate
vis-a`-vis the US dollar, improving their price competitiveness (expenditure switching or price
effect); in other cases, higher US output stimulates demand for imports without significant
exchange rate variations (expenditure boosting or quantity effect). Financial channels (i.e.,
through interest rates and equity prices) also play a role in the international transmission,
although a smaller one than the trade channel, also because they involve effects of opposite
signs. In most cases, foreign long-term interest rates increase following the US fiscal shocks,
acting as a drag on economic growth; only in a few cases they fall on impact reinforcing
expansionary effects, as suggested by the literature focusing on fiscal policy reversals as the
key driver of domestic and international responses (see Literature Review). Concerning equity
markets, a US fiscal expansion entails equity price increases in some economies, generating
positive wealth effects which could support consumption and investment; however, financial
wealth being generally highly concentrated (especially in developing countries), wealth effects
due to equity portfolios are of minor importance in channeling fiscal shocks across the board.
This paper contributes to the recently growing literature on fiscal spillovers in several
ways. First, it is one of the first studying empirically the international transmission channels
of a fiscal shock originating in the US. As we model the world economy in a single framework,
we are able to study the transmission mechanism and take into account third party effects
among the countries included in the model.1 Second, the paper highlights the differences
in the international propagation among the implemented fiscal policy tools, i.e. general
1 Spillovers among recipient economies are particularly relevant for some partners and cannot be captured
within simpler source-recipient models.
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spending and government investment, as well as personal and corporate income tax policies;
in particular, tax policy spillovers are mostly disregarded in the fiscal spillover literature.
Third, it is the first paper quantifying spillovers in terms of fiscal multipliers for each type of
spending and tax shocks and at different points in time. Finally, fiscal policy shocks in the
US are identified using narrative series (not plagued by foresight problems (Ramey, 2016a));
in the case of taxes, the narrative series allow for the identification of tax rate shocks, as
opposed to the more endogenous measure of tax revenues usually adopted in the literature
on fiscal spillovers. As far as we know, this is the first time a proxy-SVAR identification
strategy is employed in a GVAR framework.
Literature review
The paper draws on different strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature
analyzing international fiscal spillovers. The closest paper to ours is IMF (2017b), which
analyzes spillovers stemming from a global fiscal shock, aggregated across five advanced
economies; by running the local projection estimates of Jorda (2005) on the GDP of each
recipient economy separately, the paper finds that spillovers depend on the monetary policy
response (in particular at the zero lower bound) and on the degree of economic slack in source
and recipient countries. Although it addresses the relevant issue of the state-dependency of
fiscal policy effectiveness, IMF (2017b) does not focus on the transmission mechanism of
fiscal shocks, which is instead our focus. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) estimate
government spending spillovers in a panel of OECD countries; they find, in line with our
paper and IMF (2017b), positive effects on foreign output. Bussiere et al. (2017) use a
three-country specification of the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal (GIMF) model of
the IMF to simulate different types of budget-neutral spending policies in the US; they find
positive domestic and spillover effects, that can be amplified in case of a coordinated action
across countries, and a trade-off between growth and distributional consequences.
Faccini et al. (2016) estimate spillovers from a US government spending shock in a factor
model, finding positive and sizable effects on foreign output operating mainly through a
financial channel, i.e. a reduction of real interest rates abroad. This paper follows some
theoretical and empirical papers claiming that expectations of future spending reversals,
triggered by fiscal rules on debt, are such that the effect of expansionary shocks on domestic
interest rates, positive in standard models, is instead negative and acts as the main driver
of fiscal expansion in the medium run.2 According to this literature, spillovers are mainly
determined by lower foreign interest rates determined by international financial linkages
2 As also noted in IMF (2017b), in a standard Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch framework a fiscal expansion
puts upward pressure on interest rates, appreciates the nominal exchange rate, and increases domestic prices.
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(Corsetti et al. (2009), Corsetti et al. (2012), Corsetti and Muller (2013)). While we find some
negative effects on long rates in the case of corporate tax shocks, in our paper the international
transmission goes mainly through the trade channel. In this respect, our results are more
in line with those of papers that investigate fiscal spillovers indirectly, i.e. by studying the
reaction of those domestic variables that can influence foreign output dynamics, such as the
exchange rate (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2016)), the trade balance (e.g. Kim and
Roubini (2008)), or the terms of trade (Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Enders et al. (2011)).
In general, the literature on fiscal spillovers is not particularly large; it focuses only on specific
country groups and mainly on spending shocks, neglecting the tax side.3
Second, our paper is related to the strand of literature analyzing the domestic effects of
fiscal policy, specifically for the United States (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Ramey
(2011), Romer and Romer (2010), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Mertens and Ravn (2013)).
We are closer to those empirical studies using proxy-SVAR methods and the narrative
approach as identification scheme, in particular Mertens and Ravn (2013). The latter is the
paper that develops the proxy-SVAR methodology and construct the exogenous narrative
tax rate series that we use in the estimation, both for the corporate tax and the personal
income tax.4 They also quantify the effects of tax rate shocks, finding large multipliers in
the case of personal income tax rate shocks but smaller effects for the corporate tax shock,
although they do not provide explicitly an estimate of the corporate tax multiplier. In
our paper we follow the Mertens and Ravn (2013) methodology and we embody it in the
GVAR. Despite the different sample period, we find tax multipliers for the US of similar
magnitudes. Our paper is also closely related to Ramey (2016b) and Ramey and Zubairy
(2017), which provide an historical series of exogenous defense spending news, generated by
analyzing spending announcements and government balance sheets. We use that series as an
instrument to identify our spending shocks. Ramey and Zubairy (2017) is also among the first
papers investigating empirically the effects of fiscal policy when the economy is at the zero
lower bound; in our large-scale multi-country framework, constrained by data availability,
we abstract from this issue and results need to be interpreted as average responses over the
estimation period.5
Finally, our paper draws on the GVAR methodology, introduced in the two seminal
3A set of papers investigate fiscal spillovers within the Euro area, see for instance, Beetsma et al. (2008),
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) and, more recently, IMF (2017a).
4Contemporaneously, also Stock and Watson (2012) presented a similar methodology.
5Since our estimation period (1979 – 2006) is one where the US economy was not at the zero lower bound,
the results can be interpreted, as a first approximation, as applying to a situation where US interest rates
are not constrained by it. The same does not apply to all the other economies in our GVAR (e.g. Japan).
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papers by Pesaran et al. (2004) and Mauro et al. (2007). The GVAR framework has been
widely used to assess the international transmission of shocks; however, also in the GVAR
literature, the topic of fiscal spillovers has been largely under-investigated. Caporale and
Girardi (2013) and Hebous and Zimmermann (2013) study the propagation of non-identified
fiscal disturbances originated in the Euro area, while Favero et al. (2011) investigate the
effects of contemporaneous fiscal policy shocks at the global level.6 None of these studies
aims at quantifying the output effect of an identified fiscal shock stemming from the US on
the rest of the world. In our paper we aim at filling this gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the GVAR methodology,
the proxy-SVAR methodology and the identification strategy, while Section 3 discusses the
data and the specification adopted in the paper, focusing also on the cross-border transmission
mechanism of fiscal shocks. Section 4 reports the results obtained. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2. Model and identification strategy
2.1. The GVAR model
The GVAR model is a multi-country framework which explicitly allows for
interdependencies among countries and markets. The model is particularly useful to
investigate the transmission channels of shocks across countries and to quantify the magnitude
of such spillovers. The GVAR modeling strategy consists of two steps. In the first step, each
country i is modeled separately in a single-country VAR model augmented with exogenous
variables (VARX). In each VARX, the endogenous variables are domestic only (Xi,t), while
country-specific foreign variables X∗i,t, constructed as averages of all other countries’ variables,
serve as a proxy for common unobserved factors. In this way each country is affected by its
domestic developments and by the rest of the world. Each country model is estimated
separately, conditional on the foreign variables, in error correction form. In the second step,
the country-specific VARX’s are stacked together and linked using a matrix of cross country
linkages W , building in this way the global model.
6Other studies which employ the GVAR methodology to investigate fiscal shocks among Euro area
countries are Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernndez (2015) and Dragomirescu-Gaina and Philippas (2015).
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First step
Consider N+1 countries, indexed by i = 0, 1, 2, ...N . Each country is modeled through a
V ARX(K,P ) of the following form:
Xi,t = ai,0 + ai,1t+
K∑
k=1
φi,kXi,t−k +
P∑
p=0
Λi,pX
∗
i,t−p + ui,t (1)
where Xi,t is the vector of country i’s domestic variables and
∑K
k=1 φi,k are the relative lagged
coefficients; X∗i,t−p is the vector of country i’s foreign variables and
∑P
p=0 Λi,p the associated
coefficients; ai,0 and ai,1 are, respectively, the vector of intercepts and the vector of the
coefficients of the deterministic time trend. ui,t is the vector of country-specific residuals,
which is assumed to be distributed as a white noise process, i.e. ui,t ∼ i.i.d.(0,Σui ). The
vector X∗i,t plays a crucial role in the GVAR framework and it is defined in the following way:
X∗i,t =
N∑
j=1
wi,jXj,t (2)
where wi,j represents the trade share of country j for country i, i.e. the country-specific
weight of country j in the total trade of country i. Moreover, wi,j=i = 0 and
∑N
j=1 wi,j = 1.
Equation 1 can be consistently estimated assuming that X∗i,t is weakly exogenous with respect
to the other variables in the system. In words, this means that each country is considered a
small open economy with respect to the rest of the world and therefore that Equation 1 can
be estimated on a country-by-country basis.
Mauro et al. (2007) show that Equation 1 can be re-written in Error Correction (EC) form,
thus allowing for cointegration both within Xi,t and between Xi,t and X
∗
i,t, and estimated
with the Johansen procedure, modified to take into account the exogenous variables (Harbo
(1998), Pesaran et al. (2000)). The number of long-run relations is given by the rank of the
matrix Πi = αiβ
′
i. In the case where the rank of such matrix is k > 0, the model exhibits
k cointegrating relationships. The coefficients αi represents the speed of adjustment in the
process of reaching the long-run equilibrium, βi are the cointegrating vectors. The values
of the parameters αi and βi are estimated through the Johansen procedure, assuming the
foreign variables as weakly exogenous.7
7In order to avoid introducing quadratic trends in the levels of the variables when Πi is not full rank,
some form of restriction can be imposed on the parameter γi.
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Second step
After the estimation of the country-specific VARX, these are combined and stacked in
order to form the global model. Without loss of generality, we assume that a VARX(1,1) is
estimated for each country:
Xi,t = ai,0 + ai,1t+ φi,1Xi,t−1 + Λi,0X∗i,t + Λi,1X
∗
i,t−1 + ui,t, (3)
Defining
zi,t =
(
Xi,t
X∗i,t
)
, (4)
Equation 3 can be written as:
Ai,0zi,t = ai + ai,1t+ Ai,1zi,t−1 + ui,t (5)
where
Ai.0 = (I,−Λi,0), Ai.1 = (φi,1,Λi,1) (6)
The trade weights wi,j are then used to define the link matrix Wi and obtain the identity:
zi,t = WiXt (7)
with Xt = [X1,t, X2,t, ....XN,t], i.e. the vector collecting all the country specific endogenous
variables of the model. Substituting 7 in Equation 5, we obtain:
Ai,0WiXt = ai,0 + ai,1t+ Ai,1WiXt−1 + ui,t (8)
Now the country-specific models given by Equation 8 are stacked to generate the global model
for Xt:
G0Xt = a0 + a1t+G1Xt−1 + ut (9)
where
G0 =

A00W0
A10W1
...
AN0WN
 , G1 =

A01W0
A11W1
...
AN1WN
 ,
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a0 =

a00
a10
...
aN0
 , a1 =

a01
a11
...
aN1
 , ut =

u0t
a1t
...
aNt

Since G0 is a non-singular matrix that depends on the trade weights and the estimated
parameters, we obtain
Xt = b0 + b1t+ F1Xt−1 + vt (10)
where
F1 = G
−1
0 G1, b0 = G
−1
0 a0, b1 = G
−1
0 a1, vt = G
−1
0 ut (11)
Equation 10 represents the GVAR model and can be solved recursively. The variance-
covariance matrix of the global model is computed directly from the country-specific reduced
form residuals vi,t and is represented by the following:
Σv =

Σv0 Σ
v
0,1 . . . Σ
v
0,N
Σv1,0 Σ
v
1 . . . Σ
v
1,N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ΣvN,0 Σ
v
N,1 . . . Σ
v
N
 (12)
where Σvi,j is the sample covariance matrix between country i and country j and Σ
v
i is the
covariance matrix of country i.
2.2. Identification approach
In order to identify shocks in the GVAR, one needs to specify a matrix P0 that pre-
multiplies Equation 10 yielding
P0Xt = P0b0 + P0b1t+ P0F1Xt−1 + t (13)
where P0 is
P0 =

P0,0 P0,1 . . . P0,N
P0,1 P1,1 . . . P1,N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
PN,0 PN,1 . . . PN,N
 (14)
and
t = P0vt (15)
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is the vector of identified structural shocks, with covariance matrix Σ:
Σ =

Σ0 Σ0,v1 . . . Σ0,vN
Σv1,0 Σv1 . . . Σv1,vN
. . . . . . . . . . . .
ΣvN ,0 ΣvN ,v1 ... ΣvN
 (16)
We are interested in identifying shocks originating from the US only, chosen on i = 0;
therefore we need to make specific assumptions on P0,0 (to identify the US model) and then
on the other N2 + 2N P-matrices within P0. We take up these issues in the following two
paragraphs.
Identifying US fiscal shocks using external instruments. In order to identify fiscal
shocks in the US model, we rely on the proxy SVAR methodology. Restrictions on the
P0,0 matrix are obtained by using proxies for the latent shocks. In each of the four GVAR
models we estimate, following Mertens and Ravn (2013), we assume that a narrative measure,
denoted by mt, is a proxy for the unobserved structural fiscal shock of interest f,t, with
E(mt) = 0; in addition, denoting the other non-fiscal US shocks as nf,t, the methodology
assumes that the defined proxy satisfies the following conditions
E[mt, f,t] = γ (17)
E[mt, nf,t] = 0 (18)
In other words, mt is correlated with the unobserved fiscal policy shock of interest and
orthogonal with the remaining shocks. Assuming that the fiscal variable is ordered lth in the
US model, the proxy SVAR method provides the restrictions to be placed on the lth column
of the matrix P0,0. To obtain those restrictions, one must follow a two-step procedure:
• Run two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of all non-fiscal residuals in the US model,
vnf,t, on the fiscal residual vf,t, using each time mt as an instrument for vf,t; the
estimated coefficients represent each variables’ restrictions up to a scale factor;
• Impose covariance restrictions to identify each element in the lth column of P0,0.
Details on the proxy SVAR procedure are reported in Mertens and Ravn (2013). Narrative
measures of fiscal policy changes are constructed from historical sources and, as suggested
by Mertens and Ravn (2013), they can be viewed as imperfectly correlated with linear
combinations of the latent structural policy shocks.8 In order to validate the use of narrative
8Indeed, measurement errors may arise both from the fact that historical records sometimes contradict
each other, and because narrative series typically disregard minor policy changes that are censored to zero.
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series as instruments for the latent shocks, one should test the relevance of the proxy by
constructing the reliability test statistic of Mertens and Ravn (2013) that is based on the
hypothesis of linear random measurement errors. The reliability test statistic represents the
fraction of the variance of the measured variable that is explained by the latent variable; it
lies between 0 and 1, with large values indicating a high correlation between the proxy and
the true underlying tax shock.
Imposing cross-country restrictions. After having imposed restrictions on P0,0, we have
to impose restrictions on the other elements of P0. Provided that we are not interested in
identifying shocks in other countries, we assume that all the other matrices on the diagonal
of P0 are identity matrices. Concerning off-diagonal matrices, we impose all cross-country
correlations between model residuals to be zero. Indeed, correlations between the residuals
of the GVAR may occur both within countries (i.e. among variables of a country-specific
model) but also across countries (i.e. among variables in different countries). While the
first type of correlations is taken care of through the identification procedure described in
the previous paragraph, residuals can still be contemporaneously correlated across countries,
creating concerns about reverse spillover effects. Although, having conditioned domestic
models on foreign variables, cross-country correlations are generally very small, the case of
significant correlations with specific foreign variables can not be ruled out, giving rise to
possible identification issues. Given the central role of the US economy, it is reasonable to
assume that it does not react within the quarter to foreign developments. This restriction is
crucial to complete identification in GVAR models, although it is not always stressed in the
GVAR literature.
By imposing such correlations to be zero, we obtain a block-diagonal P0 matrix. Therefore,
the resulting P0 matrix is
P0 =

P0,0 0 0 . . . 0
0 I 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 . . . I
 (19)
2.3. Impulse response functions
For the dynamic analysis of shocks, the GVAR literature largely relies on Generalized
Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) (Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1997)),
that in our case take the form of Structural GIRFs (SGIRFs) as our model is fully identified.
The response of variable j at time t + n to a one standard error shock at time t given to
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variable l is given by the jth element of:
SGIRF (xt; lt, n) =
′jAn(P0G0)
−1Σel√
e′lΣel
(20)
where el = (0; 0; . . . ; 0; 1; 0; . . . ; 0) is a selection vector with unity as the l
th element and An
is
An =
p∑
i=1
FiAn−i, A0 = I, n = 1 . . . p (21)
3. Data and transmission channels
We specify four GVAR models using quarterly data. Each model encompasses 25
economy-specific VARX models, where the included economies account for about 90 percent
of world GDP.9 Subject to data availability, we consider the same set of variables for each
economy except for the US. For non-US economies, domestic variables are real GDP yi,t,
consumer price inflation pii,t, real exchange rate ri,t (defined as the nominal exchange rate
ei,t minus domestic CPI, following Mauro et al. (2007)), the 3-month interest rate i
s
i,t, the
10-year government bond yield ili,t, the real equity price index qi,t (the equity index deflated
by domestic CPI), real exports of goods and services expi,t.
1011 Foreign variables, constructed
as trade-weighted averages of variables in all other economies, are the following: foreign real
GDP y∗i,t, foreign consumer price inflation pi
∗
i,t, foreign real equity price q
∗
i,t and the foreign
3-month short-rate is∗i,t.
12
The US model is slightly different for a number of reasons. First, as our aim is to study
the effect of a fiscal policy expansion in the US on the rest of the world, we include US
fiscal variables, both on the spending and on the tax side. Government spending and tax
variables are constructed following previous works on US fiscal shocks (Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Mertens and Ravn (2013), among others). On the spending side, we consider real
government expenditure and real government investment; on the tax side, we include the
average personal income and corporate tax rates, together with their respective tax bases
9The countries included are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Euro Area, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and USA. The Euro area is constructed
as the aggregation of eight countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain.
10All variables except the 3-month and 10-year rates are set equal to 100 in 2000Q1 and expressed in
natural logarithms.
11The nominal exchange rate ei,t is defined as the exchange rate vis-a`-vis the US dollar. Therefore eUS,t = 1
for all t. For this reason the real exchange rate is not included in the US model.
12The real exchange rate is not included in the set of foreign variables of non-US models to avoid
multicollinearity.
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(net of transfers and interest payments).13 Second, we do not include US exports and equity
prices in order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated and make the identification
as neat as possible. As the instrument for both government spending and investment shocks,
we use the military news series constructed in Ramey (2011) and updated in Ramey and
Zubairy (2017), i.e. series of estimated changes in the expected present value of government
purchases caused by military events; concerning the instruments for personal and corporate
tax rate shocks, we rely on the legislated tax liability changes categorized by Mertens and
Ravn (2013) from the total tax liabilities changes recorded by Romer and Romer (2010).
Table 1 summarizes the domestic and foreign variables included in the US and non-US
models. Fiscal variables are included one at a time in each of the four models:
• In GVAR #1, the US model is augmented with the government expenditure variable;
• In GVAR #2, the US model is augmented with government investment;
• In GVAR #3, the US model is augmented with the personal income tax rate, the
personal income tax base and government expenditure;
• In GVAR #4, the US model is augmented with the corporate income tax rate, the
corporate income tax base and government expenditure;
Our tax models feature also personal and corporate income tax bases in order to be able to
calculate fiscal multipliers, and general government spending to control for the endogenous
response of fiscal policy. The GVAR model is estimated over the period 1979 Q2 – 2006
Q4 because of data availability issues: observations before 1979 Q2 are not available for all
countries, and for some instruments in our set the data is limited to 2006 Q4.
3.1. Transmission channels
Before describing the results of the paper, it is useful to summarize the main transmission
channels through which fiscal policy shocks in the US may affect real variables in the rest
of the world. The first channel operates through trade, in particular through the so-called
expenditure boosting effect. Following a fiscal expansion that increases US output, US demand
for imports increases as well, to an extent depending on the marginal propensity to import,
both of the public and of the private sector. Output in foreign countries can thus rise
through higher export demand. This direct channel can be reinforced via third-party effects,
i.e through the aforementioned mechanism working in all the foreign countries experiencing a
boost in output. The second channel is represented by the real exchange rate. The US fiscal
expansion is expected to increase domestic interest rates and to appreciate the US dollar,
13We do not include fiscal variables in non-US models also because only few economies feature fiscal data
on a quarterly frequency.
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Table 1: Summary of the variables included in the GVAR.
Non-US model US model
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
yi y
∗
i yUS y
∗
US
pii pi
∗
i piUS pi
∗
US
ri - - r
∗
US
isi i
s∗
i i
s
US i
s∗
US
ili - i
l
US i
l∗
US
qi q
∗
i GUS -
expi - TUS -
Table 1 reports the variables included in the non-US and US models. Variables are: real GDP
yi,t, consumer price inflation pii,t, real exchange rate ri,t (defined as the nominal exchange rate
ei,t minus domestic CPI), the 3-month interest rate i
s
i,t, the 10-year government bond yield i
l
i,t,
the real equity price index qi,t (the equity index deflated by domestic CPI), real exports of
goods and services expi,t. GUS can be either government spending or government investment.
TUS includes both tax rate and tax base variables, both for personal income and for corporate
income.
improving price competitiveness for all goods and services produced abroad and stimulating
foreign exports and output (expenditure switching effect).
A fiscal shock can also impact foreign GDP through the financial channel. A loose fiscal
policy stance in the US affects domestic interest rates, which in turn can impact foreign
financial variables through financial linkages. The direction in which variables can be affected
is not straightforward. On the one hand, in a standard portfolio balance model, the financial
channel should cause both domestic and foreign interest rates to rise, putting a drag on the
magnitude of spillovers on foreign output. On the other hand, an expansionary fiscal policy
in the US might generate the opposite effect, putting downward pressure on domestic and
foreign interest rates. Faccini et al. (2016) and Corsetti and Muller (2013)) obtain falling
interest rates by making the ad-hoc assumption of a subsequent reversal of the fiscal shock;
alternative explanations suggest that lower taxes may either expand aggregate supply or
increase firms savings more than investments, in both cases putting downward pressures on
prices and interest rates. Fiscal spillovers might also be channeled by portfolio valuation
effects: the equity values of foreign exporting firms might rise, producing wealth effects for
portfolio investors that could support consumption and investment.
Overall, the magnitude of fiscal spillovers is an empirical question. The relative
importance of the aforementioned channels depends on the strength of trade and financial
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linkages among the source and recipient countries, and to a smaller extent, among recipient
countries themselves. Finally, it might also depend on the composition of the fiscal shock, i.e.
whether the fiscal expansion is implemented through spending increases or tax reductions,
and also on the particular type of spending or tax instrument.
4. Results
In this section we describe the results of our estimations. In order to compare the
effects of the four shocks, we first comment on the results of the four GVAR models
together, divided between domestic and spillovers effects; then, we construct domestic and
international fiscal multipliers. The shocks of interest are: shock to total government
spending (GCGI henceforth), shock to public investment alone (GI henceforth), shock to
average personal income tax rate (PITR henceforth) and shock to corporate income tax rate
(CITR henceforth). Second, we discuss the main transmission channels.
As already mentioned, four separate GVAR models are estimated. The employed
narrative series (both on the tax and spending side) display reliability test statistics between
0,5 and 0,9, in line with values reported for tax models in Mertens and Ravn (2013) and
Mertens and Ravn (2014), validating the adopted identification procedures.14 Impulse
responses, standardized to obtain comparable results, are shown in Figures 1 to 11. All
impulse responses can be interpreted as percentage point reactions to a shock of 1 percentage
point (or -1 percentage point) size.
4.1. Domestic effects
Figure 1 and 2 display the response of US real GDP to a 1 percentage point (p.p.) shock
to US GCGI and GI and to a -1 p.p. shock to US PITR and CITR. In all the cases, the
output response is positive and significant; moreover, the effects are persistent, i.e. variables
moves gradually to their new steady state level. The timing of the response is differentiated
across the four shocks, with GDP increasing on impact following the GI and PITR shocks,
while reacting only with a lag to the GCGI and CITR shocks. Short and long-term interest
rates do not react significantly to spending shocks. On the contrary, they increase in response
to the personal income tax shock while they fall after the corporate tax shock.
In order to compare the quantitative effect of the four different shocks, we report the
results in terms of their implied multipliers, i.e. the dollar increase in GDP following a one
14In particular, the reliability test statistic equals 0,4 in GVAR model #1, 0,5 in GVAR model #2, 0,7 in
GVAR model #3 and 0,9 in GVAR model #4.
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dollar increase in spending or tax revenues, see Table 2.15 The multiplier of GCGI, the usual
proxy of spending shocks in the fiscal policy literature, is equal to 0.5 on impact and remains
below 1 later on, as already documented in the literature for the post-1980 period (e.g.
Perotti (2005)).16 Only shocks to government investment, whose share in total government
spending is much lower than that of government consumption, give sizable multipliers (2.0
after one year). By contrast, both tax rate shocks yield multipliers greater than 1: the effect
of personal income taxes is stronger and front-loaded, significant already one quarter after
the shock, while corporate taxes have a multiplier of 1.2 one year after. Our results are in
line with the recent evidence pointing to a lower multiplier for spending with respect to tax
shocks (Ramey (2017)).
Table 2: Domestic fiscal multipliers.
Impact One year Five years
Government spending (GCGI) 0.5 0.9 1.2
Government investment (GI) 1.6 2.0 2.3
Personal income tax rate (PITR) 0.3 1.3 2.0
Corporate income tax rate (CITR) n.s. 1.8 5.0
Table 2 reports fiscal multipliers for the United States in case of positive GCGI and GI shocks
and negative PITR and CITR shocks. GDP elasticities are scaled by average GDP ratios over
the 1979-2006 sample. All reported multipliers are significant; n.s. stands for not significant.
4.2. Spillover effects
Spending and tax rate shocks have positive and statistically significant, albeit relatively
small, international output spillovers. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the main economic
partners of the United States, i.e. the Euro area, China, Japan, the United Kingdom and
Canada, for which we detail the main transmission channels; for other emerging economies,
we only discuss the overall effect of shocks on economic growth.
15The response of tax revenues t periods after the shock (t = 0, . . . , n) is constructed by combining the
dynamics of the shock with the response of the tax base, following Mertens and Ravn (2013)
tˆrt = Tˆ
i
t /T¯
i + bˆit
where T is the tax rate of type i = PITR,CITR, T¯ i is the mean average tax rate and b is the appropriate
tax base; hats denote impulse responses and lower case letters denote logged variables.
16The stronger effect of spending shocks on output for the 1960-1980 period is mainly due to the huge
defense spending programs to finance Korea and Vietnam wars.
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Figure 1. US government spending shocks, domestic effects. Impulse responses of real GDP from a 1 percentage
point shock to US Government consumption and investment (GCGI) and to US Government investment (GI). Bootstrap median
estimates with 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 2. US tax rate shocks, domestic effects. Impulse responses of real GDP from a -1 percentage point shock
to US Personal income tax rate (PITR) and to US Corporate income tax rate (CITR). Bootstrap median estimates with 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 3. Government spending shock, spillover effects. Impulse responses of real GDP from a 1
percentage point shock to US Government consumption and investment (GCGI). Bootstrap median estimates
with 68% confidence bands.
Effects on GDP Spillover effects on real GDP are reported in Figures 3 to 7. Overall,
spillovers are significant in all of the main advanced economies. In particular, they are
strongest in Canada; among the other economies, the impact is slightly higher in the Euro
Area and the UK. On the other hand, the effects are not sizable in China. The shapes of
foreign GDP responses follow those of US GDP. Therefore, spillovers from PITR shocks are
front-loaded while those from GCGI, GI and CITR shocks are more gradual. Concerning
the differences between the effects of tax and spending shocks, spillovers from tax shocks
have tighter confidence bands, while those from spending shocks are not always significant.
The effect of fiscal policy on emerging countries is on average lower than that on advanced
economies (Figure 7). Among EMEs, they are stronger in Mexico and South East Asia17
than in South America18, and never significant in India.
International fiscal multipliers Tables 3, 4 and 5 quantify the effect of fiscal shocks
on GDP in recipient economies in terms of fiscal multipliers. International fiscal multipliers
are here defined as the dollar increase in foreign GDP following a one dollar increase in US
spending or tax revenues. The fiscal multiplier of country i, M i, observed t periods after the
17South East Asia is given by the GDP-weighted aggregation of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand
18South America is given by aggregating Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru
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Figure 4. Government investment shock, spillover effects. Impulse responses of real GDP from a 1
percentage point shock to US Government investment (GI). Bootstrap median estimates with 68% confidence
bands.
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Figure 5. Personal tax rate shock, spillover effects. Impulse responses of real GDP rate from a
-1 percentage point shock to US Personal income tax rate (PITR). Bootstrap median estimates with 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 6. Corporate tax rate shock, spillover effects. Impulse responses of real GDP rate from a
-1 percentage point shock to US Corporate income tax rate (CITR). Bootstrap median estimates with 68%
confidence bands.
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Figure 7. Spillovers to EMEs. Impulse responses of real GDP from a 1 percentage point (p.p.) shock
to US Government consumption and investment (GCGI) and to US Government investment (GI), lines one
and two, and a -1 p.p. shock to US Personal income tax rate (PITR) and US Corporate income tax rate
(CITR), lines 3 and 4. Latin America is the GDP-weighted aggregation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru.
South East Asia is the GDP-weighted aggregation of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. Bootstrap median
estimates with 68% confidence bands.
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shock (t = 0, . . . , N) and referred to a US fiscal instrument FIus, is given by the following:
M iF I,t =
∆Y it
∆FIust
(22)
∆FIus is the response of the fiscal instrument and ∆Y i that of GDP in country i.19
Empirically, international multipliers are computed as follows. Defining the elasticity of
GDP to the fiscal instrument at period t as the ratio of the impulse response of GDP over
that of the fiscal instrument, i.e.
iF I,t =
∆Y it
Y it
/
∆FIust
FIust
, (23)
fiscal multipliers are obtained by weighting the elasticities by the ratio of the fiscal instrument
to real GDP at some point in time
M iF I,t = 
i
F I,t
FIus
Y i
(24)
Following Ramey (2016c), we report cumulated multipliers given by
M iF I,t =
∑t
s=0 ∆Y
i
s∑t
s=0 ∆FI
us
s
(25)
In order to compute international multipliers, we calculate the ratio FI/Y in Equation 24 as
the average FI/Y ratios throughout the estimation period for each economy.20
The tables below summarize the estimates of the international fiscal multipliers, on
impact, after one year and after five years, both for spending and for tax rate shocks. On
the five year horizon, multipliers are higher for public investment and for the corporate tax
shock, while they are lowest in the case of general government spending shocks. In general,
international fiscal multipliers range between 0 and 0.4 but they lie, in most cases, in the
0.1–0.2 interval. There is variation across countries: multipliers are basically null in China
and strongest in Canada and Japan. The aforementioned results suggest that US fiscal policy
does affect economic activity in foreign economies, but its impact is limited.
19The fiscal instrument is government spending/investment – the shocked variables – in case of spending
shocks, and tax revenues in case of tax rate shocks, obtained by combining the tax rate shock and the response
of tax base as detailed in footnote 15.
20This procedure can lead to a bias when significant trends in this ratio are present (Ramey (2016c)). We
also computed the ratio using end-of-sample values and multipliers do not change significantly.
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Table 3: International fiscal multipliers, impact.
Euro area China Japan UK Canada
Government spending (GCGI) 0 0 0 0 0
Government investment (GI) 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Personal income tax rate (PITR) 0 0 0 0 0
Corporate income tax rate (CITR) 0 0 0 0 0.1
Table 3 reports the fiscal multipliers for the subcategories of spending and tax revenues, for the
Euro area, China, Japan, UK and Canada. All reported multipliers are statistically significant;
values equal to zero indicate multipliers between 0 and 0.1.
Table 4: International fiscal multipliers, one year after the shock.
Euro area China Japan UK Canada
Government spending (GCGI) 0 0 0.1 0 0.1
Government investment (GI) 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Personal income tax rate (PITR) 0.1 0 0 0 0.1
Corporate income tax rate (CITR) 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Table 4 reports the fiscal multipliers for the subcategories of spending and tax revenues, for the
Euro area, China, Japan, UK and Canada. All reported multipliers are statistically significant;
values equal to zero indicate multipliers between 0 and 0.1.
Table 5: International fiscal multipliers, five years after the shock.
Euro area China Japan UK Canada
Government spending (GCGI) 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Government investment (GI) 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.2
Personal income tax rate (PITR) 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1
Corporate income tax rate (CITR) 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3
Table 5 reports the fiscal multipliers five years after the shock for the subcategories of spending
and tax revenues, for the Euro area, China, Japan, UK and Canada. All reported multipliers
are statistically significant; values equal to zero indicate multipliers between 0 and 0.1.
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Transmission channels Figures 8 to 11 document the international transmission channels
of the US fiscal shocks. The trade channel appears to be the dominant propagation
mechanism. Two different mechanisms lie behind the trade channel, i.e. the expenditure
switching and the expenditure boosting effects, and affect the various economies in different
ways. As Figure 8 shows, following a fiscal policy expansion in the United States (both on the
spending and on the tax side), real exchange rates vis-a`-vis the US dollar depreciate for the
Euro Area, and, more persistently, for Japan and the United Kingdom, making their exports
cheaper: these countries benefit from an expenditure switching effect. However, exports rise
even in cases where the real exchange rate does not depreciate (see Figure 9), as for Canada
and China.21 Indeed, notwithstanding the behavior of the real exchange rate, exports receive
a boost from the stronger import demand in the US (in particular in Canada), suggesting
the presence of a powerful expenditure boosting mechanism.
An important transmission mechanism is also represented by financial channels. Such
channels point to the response of long-term interest rates and equity prices as vehicles for the
transmission of fiscal shocks abroad, as explained in Section 3. Overall, the effect of financial
channels on growth is ambiguous. As regards long-term rates, in most cases they increase
following the US shocks while only in few cases they fall. Indeed, in the United States, long-
term interest rates increase in the cases of GCGI, GI and PITR shocks, putting a drag on
economic activity both domestically and abroad. On the contrary, they fall significantly only
in the case of a CITR shock, reinforcing its expansionary effects. Possibly, the response of
interest rates abroad depends on the balance between foreign monetary policy reactions and
expectations of a policy reversal in the United States, acting as a drag on economic growth in
the first case (as in the Euro Area and the UK) and stimulating investment and consumption
in the second one (as in Japan).
Finally, Figure 11 reports impulse responses of stock prices, which are a possible source of
wealth effects. Effects on equity prices are stronger for spending than tax shocks, and these
are particularly relevant for the Euro Area and Japan. In developing countries the effects
are mostly not significant, independently on the fiscal instrument, probably because of the
lower responsiveness of emerging countries financial markets to real developments in the US.
However, for the reasons described in Section 3, we do not expect equity prices to be the key
transmission channel of fiscal policy across the board.
21The real exchange rate is not significant in China and works in the opposite direction for Canada
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Figure 8. Trade channel – exchange rates. Impulse responses of real foreign exchange rate from a 1
percentage point (p.p.) shock to US Government consumption and investment (GCGI) and to US Government
investment (GI), lines one and two, and a -1 p.p. shock to US Personal income tax rate (PITR) and US
Corporate income tax rate (CITR), lines 3 and 4. Bootstrap median estimates with 68% confidence bands.
5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4GCGI
Euro Area
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
China
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Japan
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
United Kingdom
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
Canada
5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
GI
5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
2
3
PITR
5 10 15 20
-2
0
2
4
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
2
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
2
5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
2
3
5 10 15 20
horizon (quarters)
-0.5
0
0.5
CITR
5 10 15 20
horizon (quarters)
-1
0
1
5 10 15 20
horizon (quarters)
-0.5
0
0.5
5 10 15 20
horizon (quarters)
-0.5
0
0.5
5 10 15 20
horizon (quarters)
-1
0
1
Real Exports
Figure 9. Trade channel – real exports. Impulse responses of real exports from a 1 percentage point
(p.p.) shock to US Government consumption and investment (GCGI) and to US Government investment
(GI), lines one and two, and a -1 p.p. shock to US Personal income tax rate (PITR) and US Corporate
income tax rate (CITR), lines 3 and 4. Bootstrap median estimates with 68% confidence bands.
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Figure 10. Financial channel – long rates. Impulse responses of nominal long-term interest rates
from a 1 percentage point (p.p.) shock to US Government consumption and investment (GCGI) and to US
Government investment (GI), lines one and two, and a -1 p.p. shock to US Personal income tax rate (PITR)
and US Corporate income tax rate (CITR), lines 3 and 4. Bootstrap median estimates with 68% confidence
bands.
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Figure 11. Financial channel – equity prices. Impulse responses of real equity prices from a 1 percentage
point (p.p.) shock to US Government consumption and investment (GCGI) and to US Government investment
(GI), lines one and two, and a -1 p.p. shock to US Personal income tax rate (PITR) and US Corporate income
tax rate (CITR), lines 3 and 4. Bootstrap median estimates with 68% confidence bands.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the international dimension of fiscal policy, analyzing
the spillover effects of fiscal shocks originating in the US. We study different subcategories
of tax rate and spending shocks, focusing on the international propagation mechanisms and
quantifying the size of the external spillover multipliers of fiscal policies. The main finding is
that fiscal spillovers are positive and statistically significant, albeit of a relatively small size,
except in the case of Canada.
This result suggests some relevant policy insights. First, the potential benefits of a
fiscal expansion the US, from the point of view of recipient countries, are generated via the
trade channel, which includes both an expenditure boosting and an expenditure switching
effect. Second, the international spillovers of US fiscal policy seem to be more relevant for
advanced countries than for the developing ones. This is in contrast with the effects of US
monetary policy, which is considered a driver for international capital flows and a source of
major concern for developing countries. Third, coordination among developed countries for a
combined fiscal stimulus would dampen one important channel through which spillovers are
transmitted, i.e. real exchange rate movements. As our results showed, the international
spillover effects are transmitted also through a real exchange rate depreciation in the
recipient countries, a channel that would be muted if the fiscal stimulus were internationally
coordinated. In this paper we did not address the question of non-linearities of fiscal policy,
which we believe is an important one and we plan to study in the future.
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